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Abstract
This paper examines the role of institutions in the nexus between public spending
and economic growth. Using a newly assembled dataset of 80 countries over the 1970-
2010 period with disaggregated public spending, we show that only when institutions
prompt governments to be accountable to the general public, does the capital compo-
nent of public spending significantly promote growth, especially when financed by a
fall in current spending or by increased revenues. Meanwhile, a rise in current spending
does not show robust growth-promoting potential, regardless of the level of government
accountability. Our interpretation of these findings is that, while capital spending in-
nately has a larger growth-fostering effect than current spending, inefficiencies inherent
in the former type of spending, caused by officeholders’ rent-seeking behavior under
unaccountable governments, mitigate its fostering effect.
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1 Introduction
When do public policies have the desired outcomes? For example, suppose that the govern-
ment’s objectives are to raise citizens’ education attainment and reduce their mortality rates.
Then, would increased education and health spending always help achieve these objectives?
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) suggest that it may not, showing that for those policies to
work, they need to be accompanied by good governance, namely by a government that is
accountable for its actions or a bureaucracy with a professional ethos. Further, suppose that
the objective is to control inflation rates. Would policy reforms aimed at increasing central
bank independence necessarily help achieve this objective? Acemoglu et al. (2008) suggest
that it may not, arguing that whether the reform works or not depends on institutions. For
example, if incumbent policymakers are unconstrained to pursue personal rents, they may
not properly implement reforms which could jeopardize their own privilege, resulting in the
failure of these reforms. 1 Thus, a general message appears to be that the state of institu-
tions, through which authority in a country is exercised, is critical for policies to yield the
desired outcomes.
Acknowledging this, the present paper investigates how institutions, particularly those
which prompt a government to be accountable to the general public, may interact with the
effects of public spending on economic growth, an economic outcome of major importance.
One strong motivation behind this question lies in the lack of consensus in the literature
regarding the growth effects of different spending components. In particular, although cap-
ital spending may be expected to enhance growth by accumulating public capital and thus
promoting private firms’ productivity, the empirical results offered thus far are not consis-
tent even qualitatively. For example, while Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and Gupta et al.
(2005) show that capital spending enhances growth, Devarajan et al. (1996) and Ghosh and
1Further, they argue that political reform is unlikely to have a significant impact when the quality
of political institutions is highest, because in such cases, there should not be much distortion in existing
policies in the first place, leaving little room for the reform to have any impact. Thus, their overall finding
is that the reform has a maximum impact when implemented in countries where the quality of institutions
is intermediate.
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Gregoriou (2008) argue that this spending has a retarding effect, particularly in developing
countries. Additionally, the empirical evidence on growth effects of current spending also
appear to be inconclusive. For instance, while Barro (2004) shows that this spending has
negative and significant growth effects, Devarajan et al. (1996) find evidence of its growth-
promoting effects in developing countries.2
However, considering the role of institutions in the nexus between public policies and
growth entails a few challenges both in terms of data and estimation. One obvious difficulty
is how to measure the extent to which institutions prompt governments to be accountable.
To tackle this, we use different proxies for the level of constraints on political officeholders,
assuming that unconstrained politicians tend to be unaccountable to the public. Specifically,
these proxies are the measures of “constraints on executives”, as a proxy for existing con-
straints on politicians, and the degree of “democracy/autocracy”, as a wider measure reflect-
ing citizens’ political participation, complemented by the index of “voice and accountability”,
an aggregate of various elements relating to citizens’ participation in selecting governments,
and the degree of “political checks/balances and electoral competition”, a measure of the
constraints from oppositions.3 The next challenge is that disaggregated fiscal data at a na-
tional level is scarce, particularly for developing countries. In order to overcome this difficulty,
we assemble a dataset based on historical data reported to the IMF’s Government Financial
Statistics (GFS) yearbook. In particular, reconciling two different methodologies present in
GFS, the dataset offers comparable spending data series in both current and capital compo-
nents, at the central government level over the 1970-2010 period. Together with the proxies
for government accountability, the final dataset contains 80 countries from different income
2Admittedly, a few important differences in these studies make it difficult to compare their results. For
instance, regarding the definition of current (or consumption, in their terminology) spending, Barro (2004)
excludes defence and education-related spending, while Devarajan et al. (1996) do not. In addition, while
the former does not particularly specify its financing source, the latter specify it as a fall in capital spending.
However, the difference in their results still implies the general lack of consensus on the growth effects of
current spending.
3“Constraints on executives” and “democracy/autocracy” measures are from Polity IV, while “ voice and
accountability” and “political checks/balances and electoral competition” are from the Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators (WGI) and the Database for Political Institutions (DPI), respectively. More precise variable
information is given below.
3
levels. As for the estimation of possible interactions between the growth effects of public
spending and accountability levels, there are a few concerns for endogeneity, including fiscal
variables’ association with business cycles. Facing this issue, we use 8-years non-overlapping
averages, yielding 5 periods per country. Further, to tackle any other endogeneity issues,
we use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimation approach
developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Blundell and Bond
(1998).
Our main findings are as follows. Only when institutions make governments accountable
to the general public, does the capital component of public spending have substantial scope
for growth promotion. Specifically, a rise in this spending component, financed through a real-
location from the current component or through a rise in total revenue, is robustly associated
with higher growth, although the association becomes more fragile when capital spending
is financed by a budget deficit. Meanwhile, a rise in current spending does not show ro-
bust growth-promoting effects for any financing source, regardless of the level of government
accountability. We obtain these results after conducting various robustness checks, such as
using restricted samples which exclude certain periods/countries, classifying countries’ ac-
countability levels in different ways, and removing possible outliers from the assembled public
spending dataset. Our interpretation of these results is that while public capital spending
tends to have a larger growth-promoting effect than current spending, its effect can be
mitigated by inefficiencies caused by officeholders’ rent-seeking behavior. Specifically, these
inefficiencies may arise when unaccountable officeholders attempt to receive “ commissions”
by granting private enterprises public capital projects or try to increase re-election prospects
by targeting narrowly-defined constituencies with, say, localized infrastructure spending.
Broadly, our results highlight the importance of the efficiency/quality of public spending
rather than its quantity. In this regard, this study is related to several papers in the literature
discussing the importance of the former. For instance, Pritchett (2000) emphasizes that not
all actual accounting costs of public investment necessarily contribute to the creation of eco-
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nomically valuable capital. Subsequently, Dabla-Norris et al. (2012) create a cross-country
index of public investment efficiency for 71 countries, considering several aspects of invest-
ment management over the four different stages: project appraisal, selection, implementation
and evaluation. While their index reflects the degree of inefficiency relating to governments’
rent expropriation, its coverage appears to be wider, capturing also the inefficiency due to
their pure inability to conduct an efficient investment management.4 Further, Tanzi and
Davoodi (1997) and Keefer and Knack (2007) find that the level of capital spending in-
creases in the worsening of corruption and institutional quality, respectively.5 This suggests
the existence of politically-induced inefficiencies inherent in this type of spending. This study
complements the above papers by directly addressing the role of institutions in the efficiency
of public capital spending in the context of economic growth.
This paper is also closely linked to the literature on institutions and their long-run eco-
nomic outcomes. In particular, since Acemoglu et al. (2001) showed the causal effect of
the former on the latter, various papers examined this relation further. For example, Ace-
moglu and Johnson (2005), unbundling institutions into “property rights institutions”, which
protect citizens against expropriation by the government and elites, and “contracting insti-
tutions”, which facilitate private contracts between citizens, show that the worsening of the
former type of institutions has larger adverse effects on growth by discouraging private in-
vestment.6 Given that the institutions we consider (i.e, the ones constraining governments’
rent-seeking behavior) are essentially “property rights institutions”, our results propose a
complementary channel through which this type of institutions affects growth, namely the
4In fact, this type of distinction of the source of public policy inefficiency is considered by Bandiera et al.
(2009), who define the “active” and “passive” waste of public policy as, respectively, a waste involving benefit
for policy makers and one caused by simple inability, lack of incentives, or excessive bureaucracy. While they
emphasize the particular importance of the latter as a source of waste in the case of Italy, this paper reminds
the importance of the former.
5Keefer and Knack (2007) argue that what is correlated with the level of capital spending is institutions
that limit government’s rent seeking, such as competitive elections and political checks/balances, rather than
the level of corruption.
6They explain this result by pointing out that while individuals often manage to mitigate the adverse
effects of weak contracting institutions by altering the terms of their contracts, they find it difficult to
mitigate states’ expropriation in this way since the state is the ultimate arbiter of contracts.
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efficiency of public capital spending.7 In general, in this sense of providing a channel between
institutions and long-run growth, our paper is also related to Alfaro et al. (2008), among
others, who highlight the importance of foreign direct investment.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset. Section
3 discusses empirical specification and methodology. Section 4 presents and interprets the
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes with policy implications.
2 The Dataset
We first provide a brief exposition of key variables, namely proxies for institutions affecting
the degree of government accountability and the decomposed public spending. We then
present summary statistics for the subsequent regression analyses.
2.1 Institutions
To select proxies for institutions affecting government accountability, we assume that political
officeholders are less accountable when they are less constrained. Based on this assumption,
our first main proxy is the measure of “executive constraints” (“constraints”, for short)
from Polity IV, measuring the degree of institutionalized constraints on the decision making
powers of chief executives.8 Although these constraints are not the same as the ones on
political officeholders, they are likely to be correlated. Our next proxy is the measure of
“democracy/autocracy” (“democracy”, for short), also from Polity IV, reflecting not only
the previous measure of “constraints” but also other democratic elements including the
degree to which citizens’ political participation is guaranteed.9 When citizens can freely
7Strictly, since we focus on expropriation by government officials, and not by elites in general, the insti-
tutions of our focus are more restricted than what they mean by “property rights institutions”.
8The variable name in Polity IV is “XCONST”.
9Moreover, this measure, whose official name in Polity IV is “POLITY2”, reflects the competitiveness
and openness of executive recruitment.
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pursue alternative political preferences, it clearly puts constraints on politicians’ irresponsible
behavior.
These two measures are complemented by the additional two proxies. The first is the
measure of “voice and accountability” (“voice” , for short), from the World Governance
Indicators (WGI). This variable aggregates various existing measures concerning citizens’
political participation and other elements promoting government accountability, including
freedom of the press and the transparency of public policies. The next is a measure of
“political checks and balances and electoral competition” (“ checks” , for short) from the
Database of Political Institutions (DPI). We assume that proper checks from the fellow
politicians and competitive elections also increase the officeholders’ accountability.10
When conducting regression analyses below, we classify countries by government ac-
countability levels, based on the national average of each accountability proxy during the
1970-2010 period, for which disaggregated public spending data is assembled.11 Specifically,
Table 10 in Appendix A divides the 80 countries covered in the regression analyses into 40
countries with high- and low-levels of accountability.12 As seen there, while those classifica-
tions roughly match across the proxies, the match is not always perfect, indicating that each
proxy may capture different institutional aspects. Consistently, Table 1 shows that the re-
spective correlation coefficients among the 80 national averages of proxies are not necessarily
high. For example, the correlation between “ voice” and “checks” is relatively low (0.65),
possibly reflecting the fact that the main sources of constraints on political officeholders are
different between them: the former being citizens and the latter being fellow politicians.
10This measure is recorded higher, for instance, when a larger number of parties form the government
coalition in a parliamentary system, while it is recorded lowest when legislatures are not competitively
elected. Its variable name in DPI is “checks” .
11Note, however, that while “constraints” and “democracy” are available for the full sample period (and
“checks” is nearly so, available from 1975 onwards), “voice” becomes available only in 1996. Thus, by using
this variable, we implicitly assume that it tends to be time-invariant.
12To ease the comparisons among different accountability proxies, we also focus on the countries for which
all the proxies are available.
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Table 1: Correlations among proxies for institutions
Exe constraint Democracy/autocracy Voice and account Pol checks/balances
Exe constraint 1
Democracy/autocracy 0.97 1
Voice and account 0.86 0.83 1
Pol checks/balances 0.76 0.79 0.65 1
Notes: Based on 80 national averages of respective institutional proxies. All the proxies take higher values when respective
institutional factors are of better quality.
2.2 Disaggregated public spending and other fiscal variables
Next, facing the limited availability of disaggregated public spending data in the cross-
country context, we assemble a dataset based on the IMF’s Government Finance Statis-
tics (GFS) yearbook. The key innovation of this dataset is to bridge major methodological
changes in the GFS manual (GFSM) which happened from mid 1990s to early 2000s with
the introduction of GFSM2001 replacing old GFSM1986. Specifically, referring to Wick-
ens (2002), who details the methodological differences between the two manuals, we create
comparable disaggregated public spending data series, consisting of current and capital com-
ponents, at the central government level over the 1970-2010 period.13 Appendix B presents
a brief summary of the data assembling procedure. Further, responding to Kneller et al.
(1999)’s point that measuring the growth effect of public spending requires explicit consider-
ation of its financing source, the dataset also contains data on the total revenue and budged
deficit, as a difference between total spending and revenue.
To shed light on the relation between institutions and the levels of different public spend-
ing components, Fig. 1 plots each different proxy discussed above against the shares of current
and capital spending components to GDP.14 Each data point in the figures represents the
8-year averages of each spending item covered in the subsequent regression analyses (the
rationale for using the averages is clarified below) and the corresponding national average
of the accountability level over the 1970-2010 period. Observe that, regardless of the proxies
13Previously, a somewhat similar disaggregated public spending dataset was assembled by Acosta-
Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013).
14The GDP figure is from the World Economic Outlook.
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used, the accountability level is positively associated with current spending, whereas it is
negatively associated with capital spending.15 One possible interpretation of these associa-
tions, similar to Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Keefer and Knack (2007), is that since public
capital spending is generally a more convenient vehicle for rent seeking, unaccountable gov-
ernments tend to increase capital, rather than current, spending to obtain rents. We will
revisit these correlations when we interpret the regression results below.
Figure 1: Institutions and public spending
10
20
30
40
50
Cu
rre
nt
 s
pe
/G
DP
2 4 6 8
Executive constraints
0
5
10
15
Ca
pi
ta
l s
pe
/G
DP
2 4 6 8
Executive constraints
10
20
30
40
50
Cu
rre
nt
 s
pe
/G
DP
−10 −5 0 5 10
Democracy/autocracy
0
5
10
15
Ca
pi
ta
l s
pe
/G
DP
−10 −5 0 5 10
Democracy/autocracy
10
20
30
40
50
Cu
rre
nt
 s
pe
/G
DP
−2 −1 0 1 2
Voice and accountability
0
5
10
15
Ca
pi
ta
l s
pe
/G
DP
−2 −1 0 1 2
Voice and accountability
10
20
30
40
50
Cu
rre
nt
 s
pe
/G
DP
0 2 4 6 8
Political checks/balances
−
5
0
5
10
15
Ca
pi
ta
l s
pe
/G
DP
0 2 4 6 8
Political checks/balances
Note: Spending at central government level
Source: Authors’ calculations
15Specifically, the coefficient of constraints (democracy, voice, checks) with current spending is 0.39 (0.36,
0.30 0.45), while that with capital spending is -0.68 (-0.69, -0.66, -0.61)
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2.3 Summary statistics
To consider the role of institutions in the nexus between public spending and growth, we
below conduct panel regression analyses. As mentioned, our reference specification adopts
8-year non-overlapping averages, creating a maximum of 5 observations per country (i.e.,
1971–78, 1979–1986, . . . , 2003–2010). The purpose of taking this measure is two-fold. First,
we attempt to abstract from the effects of business cycles on fiscal variables. Second, this
measure helps address the possible lagged effects of public (particularly, capital) spending.
Note also that since our disaggregated annual fiscal data are unbalanced, we need to choose
when we calculate each 8-year average. In our main analyses, we take the period average of
fiscal variables only if at least 3 observations are available within each 8 year.16
Table 2 describes the dataset using the 8-year average, based on 233 observations cor-
responding to the reference regression equations (e.g., Table 4). The average growth rate is
17.2 percent over the 8 years, corresponding to an annual growth rate of above 2 percent.
Turning to the fiscal variables, the share of total expenditure is about 29.3 percent on aver-
age, decomposed into public consumption and investment of 27 and 2.3 percent, respectively.
Further, with the average total revenue of 27.3 percent, the total deficit is obtained as 2 per-
cent. Lastly, the other explanatory variables, whose rationale is commented below, include
initial GDP, initial level of schooling, private investment (relative to GDP), and population
growth rates. The detailed data sources are found in Appendix C.
3 Empirical Specification and Methodology
First, we present our empirical model, highlighting the interaction between institutions and
public spending in regression equations. We then explain our estimation method, with par-
ticular emphasis on how we tackle the potential endogeneity issues.
16We conduct a robustness check below, with different threshold values to take the period average. However,
in general, a too stringent value turns out to critically reduce the number of available observations, while a
too lenient value may not exactly reflect the sample average.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: 8-year non-overlapping averages
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Growth rate (8 years) 17.2 16.7 −41.3 66.3
Total spend/GDP 29.3 9.7 11.8 54
Invest spend/GDP 2.3 2 0.3 13.7
Cons spend/GDP 27 9.9 10.4 51.5
Total rev/GDP 27.3 9.1 11.5 47.9
Overall balance/GDP 2 3.6 −11.6 13.9
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 9 1.1 5.6 10.9
Initial level of schooling 7.3 3.1 0.6 13.4
Private investment/GDP 19.9 5.2 3.7 39.6
Population growth 1.3 1.3 −1 9
Note: Statistics are based on 233 observations. The Initial GDP is the log of 2005 US$. Initial level of
schooling years are the average years of schooling for population aged between 25 and 64. The other figures
are in percent.
3.1 Empirical specification
Our empirical specification is motivated by neoclassical growth models. The models gener-
ally relate the growth of real GDP per capita to two types of variables: state and control/
environmental (hereafter, denoted as control) variables. The former variables describe the
initial position of the economy, whereas the latter determine the steady state. A key pre-
diction of such models is that when the initial position of the economy is controlled for,
an increase in steady state output leads to higher growth rates during the (seemingly) long
adjustment period towards the steady state.17 Based on this prediction, we examine how
public spending, decomposed into current and capital spending, affects the steady state and
thus the growth rate depending on the levels of government accountability.
Formally, our empirical specification is given as
yi,t − yi,t−x = (α− 1)yi,t−x + βui,t−x + f¯ ′i,tφ+
n∑
j=1
ηj z¯i,j,t + νi + ξt + i,t. (1)
The left-hand side (LHS), yi,t − yi,t−x, is the difference in the log of real GDP per capita
between year t and t−x in country i. Specifically, we set x = 8, indicating that one period lasts
17The steady state growth rate is determined exogenously in these growth models.
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8 years and thus yielding 5 observations per country at maximum.18 Explanatory variables
on the right-hand side (RHS) include initial real GDP per capita, yi,t−x and initial average
years of schooling, ui,t−x, as state variables. The former variable is used as a proxy for
initial physical capital, while the latter is used for initial human capital. Next, f¯ ′i,t is a
vector of fiscal variables as control variables, all given as average values from year t − x
to t − 1. In turn, motivated by the Solow growth model, z¯i,j,t contain the control variables
such as private investment rates and population growth rates, again as period averages.19 νi
represents unobserved country-specific effects (i.e., fixed effects). Finally, ξt is a time dummy,
capturing global shocks.
Focusing on a vector of fiscal variables, f¯ ′i,tφ, they are expressed as
f¯ ′i,tφ =
2∑
j=1
ζHj Hie¯i,j,t +
2∑
j=1
ζLj Lie¯i,j,t + γ
HHir¯i,t + γ
LLir¯i,t + χ
HHib¯i,t + χ
LLib¯i,t. (2)
In the RHS, Hi is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the government accountabil-
ity level is high in country i, whereas Li, also a dummy, equals 1 if the accountability is low.
These dummies interact with all the fiscal variables considered, all as a ratio to GDP: e¯i,j,t,
the different spending components, i.e., capital (j = 1) and current spending (j = 2); r¯i,t,
total revenue; and b¯i,t, overall budget deficit (i.e., total expenditure minus total revenue).
20
Notice, however, that because the government budget constraint implies that fiscal vari-
ables yield exact multicollinearity in Eq. 2, it is necessary to leave out at least one fiscal
component to estimate the model. Suppose, for illustration, that we leave out the budget
18The reason for this choice, rather than a commonly used 5-year period, is to allow for a potentially lagged
effect of capital spending. More practically, however, given that using a 5-year average yields 8 periods at
maximum, a number of instruments under our system GMM approach (explained below) tends to become
too large, particularly with a relatively large number of endogenous variables in the equation.
19We exclude public investment rates to avoid double-counting.
20While total revenue can be potentially decomposed into the four main sub-components, i.e., taxes,
social contributions, grants and other revenue, we do not pursue this avenue focusing on the composition of
spending.
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deficit, b¯i,t. Then, Eqs. 1 and 2 yield:
yi,t − yi,t−x = (α− 1) yi,t−x + βui,t−x +
2∑
j=1
(ζHj + χ
H)Hie¯i,j,t +
2∑
j=1
(ζLj + χ
L)Lie¯i,j,t
+ (γH − χH)Hir¯i,t + (γL − χL)Lir¯i,t +
n∑
j=1
ηj z¯i,j,t + νi + ξt + i,t.
(3)
Importantly, coefficients on the remaining fiscal variables in Eq. 3 represent the effects of
these variables on growth, particularly when financed by a change in b¯i,t, the omitted fiscal
variable. This point, first emphasized by Kneller et al. (1999), illustrates the importance
of taking the budget constraint into account when estimating the growth effects of fiscal
variables. Specifically, the coefficients on capital and current spending thus capture the effects
of a rise in the respective spending financed by an equal rise in the deficit, while the coefficient
on the revenue shows the effect of its rise corresponding to a fall in the deficit. In what follows,
we will compare the growth effect of each spending component for the alternative financing
sources, between countries with high- and low-government accountability.
3.2 Estimation strategy
We estimate this dynamic panel data model using a GMM approach. There are various rea-
sons for this choice. First, the framework is flexible enough to accommodate our unbalanced
panel. Second, it allows us to handle country fixed effects.21 Third, most notably, it enables
us to tackle the potential endogeneity of all fiscal variables through the use of internal instru-
ments (i.e., instruments based on lagged values of those variables). This is important because
endogeneity issues of fiscal and institution proxies appear to be a non-trivial concern. For
example, even if a positive correlation is observed between capital spending and growth,
this does not necessarily imply that a higher amount of such spending causes higher growth.
21To handle fixed effects, we transform variables through ‘orthogonal deviations’ (Arellano and Bover
(1995)) rather than first differencing. We use this measure because it maximizes the sample size in our
unbalanced panel.
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Causality could in fact be reverse. Furthermore, a similar concern with reverse causation is
likely to apply to the level of accountability.
While the GMM approach yields consistent estimators, however, the original ‘difference’
GMM estimators developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991)
may suffer from finite sample biases. These biases arise particularly when time series are
persistent. Indeed, Bond et al. (2001) point out that such biases are likely to be large in
the context of empirical growth models, as output tends to be a largely persistent variable.
They thus recommend the alternative ‘system’ GMM estimators developed by Arellano and
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which augment the difference estimator by
combining the regression in differences with the regression in levels in a system in which the
two equations are separately instrumented. We use this system procedure below.22
Specifically, we treat the state variables of the model, i.e., yi,t−x and ui,t−x as predeter-
mined variables, while treating all the control variables as endogenous. That is, we assume
that the country-specific time-varying shocks, i,t, are uncorrelated with initial GDP and
human capital in t−x and earlier, while they are uncorrelated with the average of the other
control variables from t− (x+ 1) to t− (2 ∗ x) and earlier. Further, to ensure the validity of
this system approach in our context, we conduct various specification tests. The first is the
Arellano-Bond test, whose purpose is to examine the hypothesis that the error term is not
serially correlated, which is implicitly assumed in the orthogonality conditions. The second
is the Hansen test, which checks the overall validity of the various instruments of the system.
22Alternatively, some recent works on fiscal policy and growth use the Mean-Group (MG) and/or Pooled
Mean-Group (PMG) estimators developed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. (1999), respec-
tively (e.g., Gemmell et al. (2011) and Arnold et al. (2011)). These estimators have their own advantages.
Notably, they allow for simultaneous investigation of long-run equilibrium relations and short-run adjust-
ment processes, with key parameters allowed to be heterogeneous (in the case of PMG, the heterogeneity is
assumed only in the short-run coefficients), while the GMM approach only considers the long-run relation
and does not allow for heterogeneity other than the intercept. However, one potential downside of these
alternative approaches is that because the use of annual data is often required (to have a large number of
time series observations), the effect of business cycles can be more problematic than in our 8-year average
framework. In addition, the fact that our highly disaggregated fiscal expenditure dataset is unbalanced does
not allow us to practically use either of these alternative estimators.
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Finally, the third is the difference-in-Hansen test, which examines the validity of the different
sets of instruments used in the level part of the system.
4 Results
First, we examine the nexus between public spending policies and growth, with and without
taking account of the role of institutions. Then, conducting various robustness checks on their
role, we provide an interpretation of the robust results. Last, we suggest that the efficiency
of public spending may be a key channel through which institutions, particularly the ones
constraining governments’ rent-seeking behavior, affect growth.
4.1 Without the role of institutions considered
Table 3 first examines the effects of public spending on growth without distinguishing coun-
tries’ institutions affecting the level of government accountability.23 In Columns (1) and (2),
where total revenue and overall deficit (both relative to GDP) are left out from the respec-
tive regression equations, the coefficient on total spending measures its effect on economic
growth, when it is financed by a rise in these fiscal variables, respectively. An increase in
total spending has a positive effect on growth only when financed through revenue, with
statistical significance at the 5 percent level. To interpret the coefficient, a rise in the ratio
of total spending to GDP by 1 percentage point, financed by an equal rise in revenue, leads
to 1.04 percentage points rise in the growth rates over the 8-year period, corresponding to
an annual rise by about 0.13 percentage points.
23To facilitate comparison with the subsequent regressions where government accountability is reflected,
this table only covers observations for which the all the institution proxies are available.
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Table 3: Public spending and growth: without institutions considered
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth over 8 years
Total spending Total spending decomposed
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total spend/GDP 1.044∗∗ −1.076
(0.430) (0.830)
Cap spend/GDP 2.888 3.468∗ 1.493
(1.887) (1.939) (1.817)
Cur spend/GDP 0.580 −1.395∗
(0.358) (0.719)
Revenue/GDP 2.120∗∗ 0.580 1.975∗∗
(0.844) (0.358) (0.792)
Deficit/GDP −2.120∗∗ −1.395∗ −1.975∗∗
(0.844) (0.719) (0.792)
Initial GDP p.c. −9.739∗∗ −9.739∗∗ −8.317∗∗ −8.317∗∗ −8.317∗∗
(4.529) (4.529) (3.647) (3.647) (3.647)
Initial Schooling 0.969 0.969 1.930 1.930 1.930
(1.999) (1.999) (1.941) (1.941) (1.941)
Private inv/GDP 2.571∗∗∗ 2.571∗∗∗ 2.342∗∗∗ 2.342∗∗∗ 2.342∗∗∗
(0.606) (0.606) (0.534) (0.534) (0.534)
Pop growth −2.918 −2.918 −4.751 −4.751 −4.751
(3.846) (3.846) (3.793) (3.793) (3.793)
Financing source Revenue Deficit Cur spend Revenue Deficit
Observations 233 233 233 233 233
No. of countries 80 80 80 80 80
No. of instruments 45 45 51 51 51
Arellano-Bond AR(1), p-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Arellano-Bond AR(2), p-value 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.13
Hansen, p-value 0.68 0.68 0.80 0.80 0.80
Diff Hansen 1, p-value 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.75
Diff Hansen 2, p-value 0.74 0.74 0.96 0.96 0.96
Notes: System GMM estimations for dynamic panel data models. Constant and time dummies are not shown for brevity. All
explanatory variables were treated as endogenous except for initial GDP p.c. and initial schooling year, which were treated
as predetermined. Orthogonal deviation was used to transform variables. Only one lag was used as an internal instrument
to reduce the number of instruments. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Diff
Hansen 1 tests the exogeneity of the instruments used in the level part (of the system) as a whole. Diff Hansen 2 tests the
exogeneity of the lagged level of output used as an instrument in the level part.
In turn, Columns (3) to (5), disaggregating total public spending into capital and current
spending components, examine the growth effects of the latter. Column (3) indicates that
although capital spending has a positive growth effect when financed by a fall in current
spending, the effect is statistically insignificant. Next, Column (4) shows that with revenue
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as a financing source (as in Column (1)), the capital component of spending, in particular,
has a positive and statistically significant effect, while the current component is insignificant,
hinting that the positive effect in Column (1) may be driven by the capital component.
Finally, Column (5), treating budget deficit as a financing source, shows that only a rise in
the current component of spending has a negative growth effect. Overall, capital spending
appears to have a larger scope for enhancing growth than current spending. Still, however, its
scope appears to be limited, with the only significant effect observed when financed through
revenue.
Regarding the other fiscal variables, the growth effect of a rise in the deficit, offset by
a fall in revenue, is negative and statistically significant (see Columns (1) and (4)), while
the alternative combination, i.e., a rise in revenue, inducing a fall in the deficit, has exactly
opposite results (see Columns (2) and (5)) due to the symmetric nature of our analyses.24
Turning to the other explanatory variables, first, the coefficient on the initial GDP per
capita (expressed in percent) is negative and significant, being consistent with the conditional
convergence hypothesis.25 Next, the years of schooling, a proxy for initial human capital, has
a positive effect, albeit the effect is insignificant. Further, as suggested by the Solow model,
the ratio of private investment to GDP has a positive effect, while the population growth
rate has a negative effect, although the latter is insignificant. Finally, the diagnostic tests
support the use of system GMM estimators, indicating the absence of serial correlation of
the error term (i.e, Arellano-Bond, AR(2)) and validating the internal instruments in the
system as a whole (i.e., Hansen test) and their subsets in the level part of the system (i.e.,
Difference Hansen tests).26
24Because of this nature, it is not necessary to show regression equations with all the possible financing
components. For example, when total spending is decomposed, all the fiscal coefficients with capital spending
as a financing component can be deduced from the remaining equations.
25The relatively small convergence rate of 8.3 percent in Columns (3) to (5) (over the 8 years) is perhaps
due to the heterogeneous sample with diverse development levels.
26One concern, however, is that the p-value of the Arellano-Bond, AR(2) test is relatively low, though this
turns out to be higher when institutional differences are considered.
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4.2 Role of institutions
We now examine the growth effects of public spending components according to the level to
which institutions prompt governments to be accountable. As illustrated in Eq. 3, our focus
is thus on the interaction terms between spending variables and government accountability
levels of each country. Using the median of the accountability level as a cut-off, the total
of 80 countries are divided into ones with high- and low-level accountability for respective
proxies (detailed in Table 10 in Appendix A). First, we use “executive constraints” and more
widely-defined “democracy/autocracy” as accountability proxies.
Regarding the role of institutions in the effect of capital spending, Columns (1) and (2)
of Table 4 indicate that while this spending item, when financed through a fall in current
spending, has a significant positive effect under more-accountable (accountable, for short)
governments for both proxies, under less-accountable (unaccountable, for short) governments,
it has a significant effect only when “democracy/autocracy” is used as a proxy. Moreover, the
effect is more economically significant under accountable governments. Specifically, a rise in
the ratio of capital spending to GDP by 0.1 percentage point, offset by the equal fall in current
spending, over the 8-year period, increases the growth rate by about 0.9 percentage points
during the same period, corresponding to an annual rise by over 0.1 percentage points.27
Next, Columns (3) and (4) show that in both accountability groups, capital spending,
financed by revenue, promotes growth, although the coefficients are again significantly larger
under accountable governments. Last, Columns (5) and (6) indicate that only under ac-
countable governments, a deficit-financed rise in capital spending enhances growth. As for
the growth-enhancing prospect of current spending, there is an indication that a rise in this
spending, financed through revenue, enhances growth under unaccountable governments. In
the case of deficit-financing cases, however, a rise in this spending has negative significant
effects, regardless of accountability levels.
27A rise in the share of capital spending to GDP by 0.1 percentage point corresponds to approximately 4
percent of average capital spending (see Table 2).
18
Table 4: Public spending and growth: role of institutions
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth over 8 years
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cap spend*Highacc 9.010∗∗ 9.035∗∗ 9.457∗∗ 9.524∗∗ 7.391∗ 7.494∗
(3.986) (4.002) (3.879) (3.903) (3.801) (3.852)
Cap spend*Lowacc 2.902 3.366∗ 3.662∗ 4.078∗∗ 1.487 1.834
(1.829) (1.877) (1.862) (1.912) (1.587) (1.638)
Cur spend*Highacc 0.447 0.489 −1.620∗ −1.541∗
(0.361) (0.365) (0.901) (0.874)
Cur spend*Lowacc 0.760∗∗ 0.712∗∗ −1.415∗ −1.532∗∗
(0.290) (0.281) (0.766) (0.748)
Revenue*Highacc 0.447 0.489 2.067∗∗ 2.030∗∗
(0.361) (0.365) (0.904) (0.881)
Revenue*Lowacc 0.760∗∗ 0.712∗∗ 2.175∗∗∗ 2.244∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.281) (0.798) (0.794)
Deficit*Highacc −1.620∗ −1.541∗ −2.067∗∗ −2.030∗∗
(0.901) (0.874) (0.904) (0.881)
Deficit*Lowacc −1.415∗ −1.532∗∗ −2.175∗∗∗ −2.244∗∗∗
(0.766) (0.748) (0.798) (0.794)
Initial GDP p.c. −8.390∗∗ −8.925∗∗ −8.390∗∗ −8.925∗∗ −8.390∗∗ −8.925∗∗
(3.683) (3.840) (3.683) (3.840) (3.683) (3.840)
Initial Schooling 2.098 2.159 2.098 2.159 2.098 2.159
(1.906) (1.943) (1.906) (1.943) (1.906) (1.943)
Private inv/GDP 2.066∗∗∗ 2.106∗∗∗ 2.066∗∗∗ 2.106∗∗∗ 2.066∗∗∗ 2.106∗∗∗
(0.512) (0.544) (0.512) (0.544) (0.512) (0.544)
Pop growth −4.991 −4.866 −4.991 −4.866 −4.991 −4.866
(3.213) (3.355) (3.213) (3.355) (3.213) (3.355)
Financing source Cur spend Cur spend Revenue Revenue Deficit Deficit
Accountability proxy Const Democ Const Democ Const Democ
Observations 233 233 233 233 233 233
No. of countries 80 80 80 80 80 80
No. of instruments 69 69 69 69 69 69
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.31
Hansen, p-value 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.89
Diff Hansen 1, p-value 0.92 0.82 0.88 0.81 0.89 0.78
Diff Hansen 2, p-value 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.83 0.80
Notes: System GMM estimations for dynamic panel data models. Constant and time dummies are not shown for brevity. All
explanatory variables were treated as endogenous except for initial GDP p.c. and initial schooling year, which were treated
as predetermined. Orthogonal deviation was used to transform variables. Only one lag was used as an internal instrument to
reduce the number of instruments. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Diff Hansen
1 tests the exogeneity of the instruments used in the level part (of the system) as a whole. Diff Hansen 2 tests the exogeneity
of the lagged level of output used as an instrument in the level part.
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Focusing on the qualitative effects, Table 5 summarizes findings on the role of institu-
tions in the growth effects of public spending, together with the cases where the alternative
accountability proxies of “voice and accountability” and “political checks and balances and
competitiveness of elections” are used. (The full estimation results with these alternative
proxies are found in Table 11 in Appendix D.) There, each cell indicates whether a rise in
a respective spending, financed by different fiscal components, promotes/reduces growth,
denoted by +/− signs with star-superscripts for statistically significant effects. Note that
since results on a rise in current spending, financed though a fall in capital spending, are the
exact opposites of the ones on a rise in the latter offset by the former, they are not presented
for brevity.
Table 5: Government accountability, spending composition and growth
Financing source Spending component increased
High accountability Low accountability
Capital spending
Const Democ Voice Checks Const Democ Voice Checks
Current spending +** +** +** +** + +* + +*
Revenue +** +** +** +** +* +** +* +*
Budget deficit +* +* +** +* + + + +
Current spending
Revenue + + + + +** +** +*** +
Budget deficit −* −* −* −** −* −** − −***
Notes: Results are based on 80 countries, covering 233 observations. System GMM estimators are used with the same
specifications as specified above in Table 4. + (−): growth enhancing (reducing). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Overall, the following main observations are in order. First, capital spending appears
to have a considerable growth-promoting scope under accountable governments, exhibiting
significant positive effects when financed through revenue, a fall in current spending, and
budget deficit, for all the proxies. Meanwhile, under unaccountable governments, this spend-
ing has more limited growth-promoting potential, with less robust results when it is offset
by a fall in current spending and with unanimous insignificant effects for the deficit-financed
case. Second, a rise in current spending, financed through a rise in revenue, may have a
growth-fostering effect particularly under unaccountable governments. Notice that these ap-
20
parent roles of institutions in the growth effects of public spending were concealed in the
previous analyses in Table 3.
4.3 Robustness
4.3.1 Restricting datasets
To check the robustness of the above observations, we first restrict the dataset used in the
reference analyses (to obtain Table 5), in terms of countries’ income levels, time periods, and
outliers in the disaggregated spending series.
Income levels Acknowledging that the dataset, covering countries from various income
levels, is rather heterogeneous, we here run the regressions excluding countries with low
income through the sample period (1970-2010).28 The summary results, without 12 low-
income countries, are presented in Table 6.29 With this restricted sample, under accountable
governments, capital spending has significant growth-promoting effects for all the financing
sources, including the budget deficit, whereas under unaccountable ones, the effects are much
weaker, with the slight sign of significant effects observed only when it is financed through
revenue. Meanwhile, a revenue-financed rise in current spending fosters growth particularly
under unaccountable governments. Overall, the results are similar with the reference case in
Table 5, except that the scope for capital spending to promote growth under unaccountable
governments is more limited.
28Specifically, we classify countries into high-, medium- and low-income levels by taking the following
procedure. First, for each of the 41 years (1970-2010), we sort 183 countries available in the IMF’s World
Economic Outlook (WEO) according to their GDP per capita level (PPP prices) into three groups: the highest
33th percentile, between the 33th and 67th percentiles, and from the 67th percentile onwards. Next, we count
the number of times each country appears in those three groups during those years. We then classify countries
that appear above the top 33th percentile most frequently as high-income countries. Similarly, countries that
appear between the 33th and 67th most frequently are grouped as middle-income countries. The remaining
countries are categorized as low-income countries. Our classification thus reflects the relative income levels
among all the countries over the whole sample period.
29We do not consider the case without the high-income countries, since it leaves too few observations.
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Table 6: Robustness check: restricting datasets
Financing source Spending component increased
Without low-income countries
Capital spending
High accountability Low accountability
Const Democ Voice Checks Const Democ Voice Checks
Current spending +*** +** +** +** + + + +
Revenue +*** +*** +** +*** +* +* + +
Budget deficit +** +** +** +* + + + +
Current spending
Revenue + + +* + +*** +*** +*** +**
Budget deficit − − −* − − −* − −**
Without period 5, 2003-2010
Capital spending
High accountability Low accountability
Const Democ Voice Checks Const Democ Voice Checks
Current spending +* +* +* +** + + + +
Revenue +** +** +* +** + + + +*
Budget deficit + + + + + + + +
Current spending
Revenue +* +** +* +* +** +** +** +**
Budget deficit − − − −* − − − −*
Without period 1, 1971-1978
Capital spending
High accountability Low accountability
Const Democ Voice Checks Const Democ Voice Checks
Current spending +* +* +* +** + + − +
Revenue +** +* +** +** + + + +
Budget deficit +* +* +* +* − − − −
Current spending
Revenue + + + + +*** +*** +** +**
Budget deficit − − − −* −*** −*** − −***
Without outliers
Capital spending
High accountability Low accountability
Const Democ Voice Checks Const Democ Checks Voice
Current spending +* +* +* +** + + + +
Revenue +** +* +* +** + + + +
Budget deficit +* + + +* + + − +
Current spending
Revenue + + + − + + + +
Budget deficit − − − −* −* −* − −***
Notes: For the case without low-income countries (period 5, period1, outliers), results are based on 68 (77, 77, 80)
countries covering 207 (196, 195, 218) observations. System GMM estimators are used with the same specifications as
specified above in Table 4. + (−): growth enhancing (reducing). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The underlying
estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
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Time periods Next, to address the possibility that the results may be driven by observa-
tions in some particular periods, for instance, the final 8-year period (2003-2010) in which
many of the advanced economies faced a surge in budget deficit after the financial crisis, we
run the regressions excluding some specific periods. Table 6 presents the results for the cases
without the last (2003-10) and the first (1971-78) periods, respectively. It again shows that
capital spending has strong growth-promoting potential only under accountable governments,
with a reallocation from current spending never showing promoting effects under unaccount-
able governments. However, even under the former governments, the growth-promoting effect
of deficit-financed capital spending appears less robust. As for a revenue-financed rise in cur-
rent spending, the case without period 5 suggests that this policy measure may foster growth
regardless of the level of accountability.
Outliers We also consider the possible roles of outliers. Arguably, the most important
source of outliers may be the disaggregated public spending series. For example, despite our
effort to construct the consistent series across different methodologies, the unification process
may still leave unintended gaps across time, which could bias the results in our estimations
exploiting time variations in public spending. Given this possibility, we first examine if there
are any unusual “jumps” in the respective spending series. In particular, describing the
changes between adjacent 8-year periods in the spending series, Figure 2 hints the existence
of some outliers, including rises in capital spending by almost 10 percentage points and in
current spending by more than 15 percentage points.30
To deal with them, we tentatively regard the 2 largest rises, including the apparent
outliers mentioned, and the 2 largest falls (to be symmetric) in each series as outliers, and
then remove all the subsequent fiscal data in countries where these outliers are detected.
Table 6 confirms that the growth-promoting effects of capital spending are still significant
only under accountable governments, particularly when it is financed by a fall in current
30This increase in capital spending, for instance, is observed in Gabon between the 2nd and 3rd 8-year
periods, i.e., between 1979-1986 and 1987-1994 periods. To note, this is not due to potential unification
errors, since the migration from GFSM1986 to 2001 happens from mid 1990s and early 2000s.
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Figure 2: Outliers in disaggregated public spending series
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spending and a rise in revenue. Meanwhile, the growth-fostering effect of revenue-financed
current spending under unaccountable governments are no longer observed.
4.3.2 Amending datasets
Next, instead of restricting the reference dataset, we now make some amends to it, by
considering a different way of classifying governments’ accountability levels, a different cut-off
value to form the 8-year average, and a different duration of each period.
Different cut-off to classify accountability levels We first check if the results are sen-
sitive to changes in the threshold values for the classification of the accountability levels. In
particular, while the above reference analysis summarized in Table 5 adopts the median value
as a threshold, we now change it to the lower-third (33 percentile), implying that only gov-
ernments with particularly low accountability are now classified as unaccountable.31 Table 7
31For the higher threshold, we divide at the 60 percentile rather than at the (more natural) 67 percentile,
because in terms of “executive constraint”, one of the proxies, more than a third of 80 countries actually
score the maximum (7) on average, making the division at the latter percentile not feasible. For the 60
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shows that the growth-fostering effects of capital spending, financed through a fall in current
spending and a rise in revenue, are robust only under accountable governments. Regard-
ing the revenue-financed rise in current spending, we again see some indication that it may
be growth-enhancing only under unaccountable governments, thought it is not necessarily
robust.
Different cut-off to form fiscal period averages With unbalanced fiscal data series, the
analyses so far take the 8-year period average if at least 3 annual observations are available
within the period. Here, we change the threshold value to 4 observations, which implies
that each observation becomes closer to the real (but not observed) average, at the cost of
losing observations (211) and covering a smaller number of countries.32 Table 7 again conveys
similar results regarding the effectiveness of capital spending, while the statistical significance
of the revenue-financed rise in current spending under unaccountable governments is largely
lost.
7-year averages Further, we use a different length of each period, the 7-year period,
from 1976 onwards (yielding 5 observations at maximum per country), instead of the 8-year
period used above.33 The 7-year average is formed when there are at least 3 fiscal variables
in each period. The results in Table 7 once again highlight robust growth-fostering effects of
capital spending only under accountable governments, notably with no signs of such effects
under unaccountable governments. However, as in the previous case, there is little indication
percentile, however, the results (not shown for brevity) are quite similar to Table 5, the case with the median
as a cut-off.
32When we experiment with the threshold value of 2, instead, the validity of internal instruments tends
to be lost, with the Arellano-Bond test implying the existence of serial correlation in the error term. These
apparent invalid results may be related to the fact that each 8-year average is too far away from the real
average.
33We consider the 1976-2010 period, because considering, for instance, the 1971-2005 period happens to
leave substantially less observations. To note, considering a shorter period length, say 5 years, turns out to be
less plausible, since by having more periods (8 maximum periods, with 5-year averages), a required number
of instruments dramatically increases, particularly with a relatively large number of endogenous variables
including all the interaction terms. Further, shorter periods may not allow sufficient time for the growth
effects of capital spending to materialize.
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that revenue-financed current spending has growth-promoting effects under unaccountable
governments.
Table 7: Robustness check: amending datasets
Financing source Spending component increased
Cut-off at 33 percentile to classify countries
Capital spending
High accountability Low accountability
Const Democ Voice Checks Const Democ Voice Checks
Current spending +* +* +* +* + + + +**
Revenue +* +* +* +** + +* + +**
Budget deficit + + + + + + + +
Current spending
Revenue + + + + +*** +*** +* +
Budget deficit − − −** −** − − − −***
Different cut-off to form period average
Capital spending
High accountability Low accountability
Const Democ Voice Checks Const Democ Voice Checks
Current spending +* +* +* +** +* +* + +
Revenue +* +* +** +** +* +** + +
Budget deficit + + + + + + + +
Current spending
Revenue + + + + + + +* +
Budget deficit − − −** −** −* −** − −**
7-year averages, 5 periods
Capital spending
High accountability Low accountability
Const Democ Voice Checks Const Democ Voice Checks
Current spending +** +** +* +* + + − +
Revenue +** +** +* +* + + − +
Budget deficit +* +* + + − − − −
Current spending
Revenue − + − + + +* + +
Budget deficit −** −** − −* −*** −*** −* −***
Notes: Results on the different cut-off for classification (the higher threshold to form period average, 7-year averages)
are based on 80 (76, 80) countries covering 233 (211, 233) observations. System GMM estimators are used with the same
specifications as specified above in Table 4. + (−): growth enhancing (reducing). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The underlying estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
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4.3.3 Clarification of robust results
Combining all reference and robustness checks results, our robust findings on the role of
institutions in the nexus between public spending and growth are twofold.34 First, and most
important, only under accountable governments does a rise in capital spending promote
growth, particularly when it is financed through a fall in current spending or by a rise in
revenue. Second, a rise in current spending does not have robust significant growth-promoting
effects for any financing source, regardless of the level of government accountability.
4.4 Interpretation
We now attempt to shed light on those observations by providing possible interpretations.
First, in general, public capital spending appears to have innately stronger growth-promoting
effects than current spending, because it can increase public capital and thus enhance private
firms’ productivity.35 This common presumption appears to be consistent with our obser-
vation that current spending does not exhibit growth-enhancing effects for any financing
source, regardless of the level of government accountability. However, why are the expected
growth-enhancing effects of capital spending observed only under accountable governments?
Our answer is closely related to the insightful discussions by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997)
and Keefer and Knack (2007) on corruption, institutions and public spending. First, it is
useful to acknowledge that there tends to be larger room for discretion by politicians in
capital than current spending: they often can decide not only the overall size of capital
spending, but also its timing and allocations, whereas current spending is often governed by
34We conducted further robustness checks, including the addition of commonly-used controls in growth
regressions, such as inflation rates and the degree of trade openness to the reference estimations of Table 5.
Assuming that each variable is considered endogenous, we add them in turn, rather than together, to avoid
a substantial increase in the number of internal instruments under the system GMM estimations. Detailed
estimation results, which are in line with the ones from the other robustness checks, are available from the
authors upon request.
35Of course, when considering individual subcomponents within current spending, certain components,
such as operations and maintenance of existing infrastructures, may potentially enhance growth. However,
various current components, including social benefit spending, which often accounts for a large proportion
of current spending, do not appear to entail such enhancing effects (see, for instance, Feldstein (1974)).
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explicit entitlements/commitments (e.g., wages, pensions and interest payments on the debt).
This discretionary nature of capital spending, in turn, provides officials with convenient rent-
seeking opportunities, often in the form of commissions from private enterprises, who attempt
to secure the contract for capital projects.36 Then, these rent-induced distortions may lower
the quality of final capital goods for various reasons: contractors may skimp on the quality of
projects to incorporate commissions; contractors of low-ability/efficiency may be chosen in
the first place; the project itself may be unnecessarily inflated or even economically wasteful
projects may be undertaken to facilitate officials’ rent seeking. Besides, since this spending
provides a convenient means to target narrowly-defined constituencies with, say, localized
infrastructure spending, officials may also use it to gather votes (see Cadot et al. (2006)
for the case of France). Overall, these politically-induced inefficiencies under unaccountable
governments are likely to mitigate the innate growth-promoting effect of capital spending.
To shed further light on the result for capital spending under accountable governments,
the observation that growth-enhancing effects of this spending are robust only when it is
financed through a reallocation from current spending or by a rise in revenue indicates that
the choice of the financing source matters. In particular, even under accountable governments,
a deficit-financed rise in capital spending does not exhibit a robust growth-promoting effect.
This seemingly significant adverse effect of running budget deficits could be related to the
fact that persistent and large deficits can lead to growing public debts, which in turn may
retard economic growth through, for instance, mounting interest payments.37
4.5 Public spending as a link between institutions and growth
The above result suggests that the efficiency of capital spending may work as a potential
channel through which good institutions promote growth. To examine if this channel may be
specifically operative to the institutions constraining officials’ rent-seeking behaviour, we now
36This opportunity for rent prevails because, even when such payment, often synonymous to bribes, is
illegal, the complex nature of the design/contracts of capital projects makes it hard to detect it.
37These adverse effects appear to be particularly large in the case of sovereign debt crises such as the
recent ones in Southern Europe.
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interact the “contracting institutions” defined by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), with the
effectiveness of public spending. To clarify, this is a different type of institutions, because
it is primarily about the horizontal relations in society between regular citizens, through
the formalism of law enforcement, whereas our focus in the above analysis was rather on the
vertical relations between politicians and citizens, similar to the “property rights institutions”
defined by the same authors. As a proxy for the contracting institutions, we use “legal
enforcement of contracts” from the Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report (EFW),
the aggregate of the estimates for the time and money required to collect a debt through
court.38 Although the figures are available only after 2002 onwards, Table 8 shows that the
correlations of national averages of this proxy with the previously-used institutional proxies
are rather low (about 0.3), implying that they capture different aspects of institutions (cf.
Table 1).39
Table 8: Correlations among different proxies
Executive constraint Democracy/autocracy Contract enforcement
Executive constraint 1
Democracy/autocracy 0.97 1
Contract enforcement 0.28 0.29 1
Notes: Based on 79 national averages of respective institutional proxies. All the proxies take higher values when respective
institutional factors are of better quality.
Then, classifying countries by the enforcement level with the median level as a cut-off
and using the same dummy variable approach as above, we interact contracting institutions
with the public spending components. The summary results reported in Table 9 indicate
that better contracting institutions, proxied by better contract enforceability, do not neces-
sarily imply higher effectiveness of capital spending. We conducted various checks (in line
with Table 6 and Table 7), confirming that this finding is robust to different specifications.
Therefore, the efficiency of capital spending does not appear to be a universal channel be-
38Their original sources of the data on time and monetary costs of settling the debt case are World Bank’s
Doing Business.
39To make comparison easier, we only look at the countries for which all the previous measures of institu-
tions are available. This restriction leaves a total of 79 countries available for this enforcement proxy.
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tween institutions and growth, indicating the possibility that it may be specific to the ones
governing the vertical relations, as in the property rights institutions.
Table 9: Spending efficiency as a link between institutions and growth:
Financing source Spending component increased
Capital spending
High enforcement of law Low enforcement of law
Current spending + +
Revenue + +*
Budget deficit + +
Current spending
Revenue + +
Budget deficit − −**
Notes: Results are based on 79 countries covering 232 observations. System GMM estimators are used with the same
specifications as specified above in Table 4. + (−): growth enhancing (reducing). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The underlying estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
5 Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the seemingly elusive nexus between public spending and economic
growth from the perspective of institutions. Our main finding is that capital spending has
growth-enhancing effects only when institutions render political officeholders accountable
to the general public. These effects are particularly robust when this spending is financed
though a fall in current spending or a rise in revenue. Meanwhile, an increase in current
spending does not show robust growth-fostering effects for any financing source, regardless
of the level of accountability. Our main interpretation is that, while capital spending tends
to have larger growth-fostering effects than current spending, inefficiencies prevalent in the
former type of spending, caused by unaccountable officials’ rent-seeking behaviour, may
mitigate its positive effects.
The critical implication then is that, to the extent that policies ensure that institu-
tions leave smaller room for politicians’ rent seeking in the public investment management,
such policies may help enhance the efficiency of this spending component and thus promote
growth. Thus, the question is, which potentially viable policies have such effects? Inspired
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by Dabla-Norris et al. (2012), who investigate public investment efficiency by dividing the
investment management into the four stages of project appraisal, selection, implementation
and evaluation, we suggest a few possible measures which may have such effects. For in-
stance, in the appraisal stage, an independent peer review can be encouraged to help ensure
the objectivity and quality of project appraisals; in the project selection stage, key informa-
tion such as the external audit reports and contract awards should be disclosed to the public;
the implementation stage should then be accompanied with the comprehensive expenditure
commitment controls; last, in the evaluation stage, routine evaluation by the auditor general
should become mandatory. All these measures would help ensure policymakers to be more
accountable and thus be expected to improve the efficiency of capital spending.
Finally, we conclude by acknowledging a possible extension. Although we consider the
effects of capital spending while treating private investment as given, it would eventually
be more realistic to assume that there is a non-negligible interaction between them. When
allowing for such an interaction, one factor which is likely to matter is the degree of substi-
tutability/complementarity between the public and private investments. For example, Baier
and Glomm (2001) theoretically show that, depending on the degree of substitution between
them, public investment can either crowd out or in private investment, thus having different
growth effects. Given that it appears plausible to think that accountable governments, in
particular, may attempt to crowd in (rather than out) private investment, institutions may
in fact play further critical roles in the nexus between public spending and growth. Thus,
although it is beyond the scope of the present paper, an investigation into the role of insti-
tutions in the interaction between the public and private investments may be a potentially
fruitful avenue for future research.
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Appendix
A Classification of countries by institutions
Table 10 classifies the 80 countries used in the reference regressions (cf. Table 5) into 40 coun-
tries with high- (low-) government accountability, based on the respective national averages
of respective proxies over the 1970-2010 period.
Table 10: Classification of countries by accountability levels
Country Exe constraints Democracy/Autocracy Voice and accountability Checks/Balances
Argentina Low Low Low High
Australia High High High High
Austria High High High High
Bahrain, Kingdom Low Low Low Low
Belgium High High High High
Bolivia High Low Low High
Bulgaria Low Low High Low
Burundi Low Low Low Low
Cameroon Low Low Low Low
Canada High High High High
Chile Low Low High Low
Colombia High High Low Low
Costa Rica High High High High
Croatia High Low Low Low
Cyprus High High High Low
Czech Republic High High High High
Denmark High High High High
Dominican Republic Low High Low High
Egypt Low Low Low Low
El Salvador Low Low Low Low
Estonia High High High High
Fiji High High Low High
–continued on next page
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–continued from previous page
Country Exe constraints Democracy/Autocracy Voice and accountability Checks/Balances
Finland High High High High
France High High High High
Gabon Low Low Low Low
Germany High High High High
Greece High High High Low
Guatemala Low Low Low Low
Hungary Low Low High Low
India High High Low High
Indonesia Low Low Low Low
Iran, I.R. of Low Low Low Low
Ireland High High High High
Israel High High High High
Italy High High High High
Jamaica High High High High
Japan High High High High
Jordan Low Low Low Low
Kenya Low Low Low Low
Korea, Republic Low Low High Low
Kuwait Low Low Low Low
Latvia High High High High
Lesotho Low Low Low Low
Lithuania High High High Low
Luxembourg High High High High
Mauritius High High High High
Mexico Low Low Low Low
Mongolia Low Low Low Low
Morocco Low Low Low Low
Namibia Low High Low Low
Netherlands High High High High
New Zealand High High High Low
–continued on next page
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–continued from previous page
Country Exe constraints Democracy/Autocracy Voice and accountability Checks/Balances
Norway High High High High
Pakistan Low Low Low Low
Panama Low Low High Low
Paraguay Low Low Low Low
Peru Low Low Low Low
Philippines Low Low Low Low
Poland Low Low High Low
Portugal High High High Low
Romania Low Low Low High
Russian Federation Low High Low High
Singapore Low Low Low Low
Slovak Republic High High High High
Slovenia High High High High
South Africa High High High Low
Spain High High High High
Sri Lanka High High Low High
Sweden High High High High
Switzerland High High High Low
Tanzania Low Low Low Low
Thailand Low Low Low High
Togo Low Low Low Low
Tunisia Low Low Low Low
Turkey High High Low High
Ukraine High High Low High
United Kingdom High High High High
United States High High High High
Uruguay High High High Low
Zambia Low Low Low Low
Notes: This table contains 80 countries corresponding to the reference case above. The median value is used as a cut-off
value of each series, so that each comprises 40 high- and low-accountability countries.
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B Construction of fiscal dataset
To explain how we construct unified disaggregated spending series following economic clas-
sifications, we start with clarifying the main differences in the exact definitions of ‘current’
and ‘capital’ concepts under GFSM2001 and GFSM1986 (see Wickens (2002) for details).
First, the capital expenditure concept under GFSM2001, denoted as ‘net acquisition of non-
financial assets’ adopts a net concept, taking into account government revenue from the sales
of fixed capital assets, while capital expenditure under GFSM1986, following a gross concept,
does not deduct the revenue from capital sales, which is recorded as part of total revenue.
Second, while capital transfers were a part of capital expenditure under GFSM1986, they
are part of the current expenditure concept, denoted as ‘expense’, under GFSM2001.
Facing these differences, we first retrieved all historical spending data available for all
countries that have reported data to the IMF’s GFS yearbook from 1970 to 2010 and then
converted all spending items under GFSM1986 into the concepts defined by GFSM2001, so
that the capital spending in our spending series deducts sales revenues and excludes capital
transfers, with the latter included in the current spending. However, there is one key re-
maining issue to be dealt with, related to the fact that the concept of ‘consumption of fixed
capital’, i.e., a decline in the value of fixed assets owned and used by a government (due to
physical deterioration, obsolescence, or accidental damages), exists only under GFSM2001.
This implies that the capital spending under GFSM1986 and GFSM2001 are still not con-
sistent, with the former not deducting this ‘depreciation’ of capital. To deal with this, for
the data originally retrieved from GFSM2001, we move the consumption of fixed capital,
originally categorised as current spending, to the capital spending component, so that the
modified capital spending component become comparable to the ones from GFSM1986, i.e.,
without the depreciation deducted.
We also report that the level of government covered in the unified dataset is at the
central government level. This is because under GFSM1986, countries report data at most
at the central government level, although under GFSM2001, they also provide data for the
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general government level. We use both consolidated and budgetary data to maximise the
number of observations available. Last, to construct consistent total revenue series spanning
two methodologies, for the total revenue data retrieved from GFSM1986, we exclude the
revenue from sales of capital assets, to make it in line with the total revenue concept under
GFSM2001. Having made the current and capital spending and total revenue comparable
between the methodologies, we subsequently obtain the budget deficit as a difference between
total expenditure, as a sum of current and capital spending, and total revenue.
C Data sources
The GDP growth rate is obtained as the log difference over 8 years of real GDP per capita
taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT) (Feenstra et al. (2013)). Initial real GDP per
capita is from the same source. All the fiscal variables are originally from the IMF’s GFS
yearbook. To calculate fiscal data as a ratio to GDP, GDP figures are taken from the World
Economic Outlook (WEO), while exchange rate data, required for unit conversion, are from
both the WEO and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) databases of the IMF. Turning
to the other explanatory variables, years of schooling (for the population aged between 25 and
64) is from Barro and Lee (2010). The private investment ratio is calculated as a difference
between the total investment ratio (the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP, from
WEO) and the share of capital spending in GDP that we assembled. The population growth
rate is from WEO. Last, the government accountability proxies of executive constraints,
democracy/autocracy, voice and accountability, and political checks/balances are from Polity
IV (Marshall et al. (2013)), Polity IV, the Database for Political Institutions (DPI, Beck
et al. (2001)), and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, Kaufmann et al. (2010)),
respectively, while the law enforceability proxy is from the Economic Freedom of the World
Annual Report (EFW, Gwartney et al. (2013)).
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D Full estimation results
Table 11 presents the full estimation results behind Table 5.
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Table 11: Public spending and growth: role of institutions with alternative proxies
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth over 8 years
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cap spend*Highacc 11.046∗∗ 6.931∗∗ 11.525∗∗ 7.161∗∗ 9.344∗∗ 5.444∗
(4.875) (2.818) (4.738) (2.810) (4.676) (2.844)
Cap spend*Lowacc 1.908 3.123∗ 3.080∗ 3.587∗ 1.237 1.404
(1.873) (1.811) (1.849) (1.917) (1.446) (1.654)
Cur spend*Highacc 0.479 0.230 −1.702∗ −1.487∗∗
(0.346) (0.392) (0.937) (0.741)
Cur spend*Lowacc 1.172∗∗∗ 0.463 −0.671 −1.719∗∗∗
(0.327) (0.316) (1.033) (0.545)
Revenue*Highacc 0.479 0.230 2.180∗∗ 1.717∗∗
(0.346) (0.392) (0.970) (0.791)
Revenue*Lowacc 1.172∗∗∗ 0.463 1.843∗ 2.182∗∗∗
(0.327) (0.316) (1.006) (0.668)
Deficit*Highacc −1.702∗ −1.487∗∗ −2.180∗∗ −1.717∗∗
(0.937) (0.741) (0.970) (0.791)
Deficit*Lowacc −0.671 −1.719∗∗∗ −1.843∗ −2.182∗∗∗
(1.033) (0.545) (1.006) (0.668)
Initial GDP p.c. −8.930∗∗ −6.950∗∗ −8.930∗∗ −6.950∗∗ −8.930∗∗ −6.950∗∗
(3.474) (3.400) (3.474) (3.400) (3.474) (3.400)
Initial Schooling 2.893 2.414 2.893 2.414 2.893 2.414
(1.908) (1.699) (1.908) (1.699) (1.908) (1.699)
Private inv/GDP 2.321∗∗∗ 1.818∗∗∗ 2.321∗∗∗ 1.818∗∗∗ 2.321∗∗∗ 1.818∗∗∗
(0.491) (0.506) (0.491) (0.506) (0.491) (0.506)
Pop growth −4.609 −5.583∗ −4.609 −5.583∗ −4.609 −5.583∗
(3.699) (3.140) (3.699) (3.140) (3.699) (3.140)
Financing source Cur spend Cur spend Revenue Revenue Deficit Deficit
Accountability proxy Voice Checks Voice Checks Voice Checks
Observations 233 233 233 233 233 233
No. of countries 80 80 80 80 80 80
No. of instruments 69 69 69 69 69 69
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 0.29 0.14 0.29 0.14 0.29 0.14
Hansen, p-value 0.96 0.82 0.97 0.86 0.87 0.84
Diff Hansen 1, p-value 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.70 0.96 0.67
Diff Hansen 2, p-value 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.53 1.00
Notes: System GMM estimations for dynamic panel data models. Constant and time dummies are not shown for brevity. All
explanatory variables were treated as endogenous except for initial GDP p.c. and initial schooling year, which were treated
as predetermined. Orthogonal deviation was used to transform variables. Only one lag was used as an internal instrument to
reduce the number of instruments. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Diff Hansen
1 tests the exogeneity of the instruments used in the level part (of the system) as a whole. Diff Hansen 2 tests the exogeneity
of the lagged level of output used as an instrument in the level part.
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